ABSTRACT. It is known that the development of quantum computers will break the cryptographic schemes that are in use today. Since Shor's algorithm is able to solve the factoring and discrete logarithm problems, all cryptographic systems based on these two problems will get broken in the presence of large-scale quantum computers. Lattice-based schemes, however, are considered secure against attacks with these new machines. In this paper we present an overview of lattice-based cryptosystems, showing the most recent and the most promising candidates for encryption and signatures based on lattice problems. We explain the advantages and disadvantages of the cryptographic schemes. We also adjoin details about zero knowledge identification. With this work we try to give insight to one of the most promising candidates of future cryptography, for the time when potential quantum computers exist. We also point out drawbacks of these systems, which discloses directions for future work in lattice-based cryptography.
Introduction
Lattice-based cryptography gained a lot of interest in the past few years. It is a very vivid field of research with numerous publications at the top conferences in the cryptographic community. Multiple workshops and schools are organized in this area. New cryptographic schemes based on lattices are invented and, as a highlight, the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme has been developed based on the hardness of lattice problems.
As of today, the security of cryptosystems that are used in the wild is based on well-known number theoretic problems, namely the factorization problem and the problem of computing discrete logarithms. Algorithms for solving these two problems have been studied for decades. The fastest classical algorithms have runtime that is sub-exponential in the main security parameter. On quantum computers, however, Shor's algorithm is able to solve both problems in polynomial runtime. Therefore, the construction of powerful quantum computers will threaten modern cryptography.
In contrast, the security of lattice-based cryptosystems is based on problems that, so far, cannot be attacked with quantum computers. Even on classical computers there is no algorithm for solving these problems which runs faster than exponential in the main security parameter. Lattice-based cryptography belongs to the field of post-quantum cryptography, which furthermore consists of cryptosystems based on problems in coding theory, cryptosystems based on multivariate quadratic equation systems and signature schemes based on hash functions.
Compared to the other candidates of the post-quantum era, lattice-based cryptography has one important advantage: The security of lattice schemes can be reduced to worst-case problems, whereas in other areas of cryptography security is based on average-case problems only. This property distinguishes latticebased cryptography not only from the other post-quantum areas, but from all used candidates in cryptographic practice.
There are some more advantages of lattice-based cryptography. Most of the schemes in this area only require very few and easy operations in order to compute signatures or ciphertexts. The operations in use are products of matrices with vectors, sums of vectors, or multiplication of polynomials. These operations are faster than, for example, exponentiation, that is used in current classical systems like RSA or ElGamal.
The first lattice-based schemes date back to the mid 90s. The first secure scheme equipped with a hardness proof based on lattice problems was the hash function by A j t a i [Ajt96] . Its security was based on the Short Integer Solution problem (SIS). H o f f s t e i n, P i p h e r and S i l v e r m a n proposed NTRU encryption and signature scheme [HPS96] . G o l d r e i c h, G o l d w a s s e r and H a l e v i proposed the GGH encryption scheme [GGH97] . Of those early schemes only NTRU encryption and Ajtai's hash function remain secure. In subsequent years, Ajtai's original work was improved [GGH97] , [MR07] . In 2005, R e g e v proposed a new lattice problem, namely the Learning with Errors problem (LWE). It allowed the construction of worst-case reductions for encryption schemes [Reg05] . Development of lattice-based cryptography until 2008 is well described in [BDS08] . After 2008, there were many new proposals, e.g., signature schemes [LM08] , [Lyu09] , [Lyu12] , encryption schemes [SSTX09] , [LP11] , [SS11] , fully homomorphic encryption schemes [Gen09] , [BV11] , [BGV11] , and many more. We decided to give this overview since the current schemes are already very promising and allow a good overview of what is possible based on lattice problems. In addition, reviewing what has been done so far will reveal drawbacks that can be avoided in the future.
Our contribution
In this paper we present an overview of the most recent and most promising cryptographic schemes with hardness based on lattice problems. More exactly, we present the following schemes:
• the treeless signature scheme in [Lyu12] ,
• the trapdoor-signature scheme in [GPV08] using the trapdoor of [MP12] ,
• the LWE encryption scheme in [LP11] , • the provably secure NTRU encryption scheme in [SS11] , and
• the identification scheme by zero-knowledge proofs in [KTX08] .
We discuss their advantages and disadvantages and try to motivate why these schemes are valuable candidates for future cryptography.
Organization of the paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the required background on lattices and cryptography as well as our notation in Section 2. The description of the selected cryptographic signature and encryption schemes is shown in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively. Further schemes are detailed in Section 5. Finally we present a conclusion in Section 6.
Preliminaries
Originally, most lattice schemes are developed over integer lattices, i.e., the schemes mostly deal with matrices and vectors as elements. In order to have more efficient computations and save storage, most of the schemes were later transformed to the ring setting, namely dealing with polynomials over rings instead. Here we deal with the more efficient ring variants of the schemes. Only the trapdoor signature and the identification scheme are matrix-based.
We will use the polynomial rings
that is monic and irreducible over Z. An example choice for f (x) is f (x) = x n + 1 for n being a power of 2. This is the most commonly used polynomial ring in cryptography. Other possible choices are f (x) = n i=0 x i for n + 1 being prime.
Ring elements are denoted p, whereas vectors of ring elements are written asp.
[m] denotes the set {1, . . . , m} and a||b is the usual string concatenation of a and b.
For ← S denote the sampling of a uniformly random chosen element x from the set S, i.e., x is the output of a uniformly random choice of an element out of the set S, and let x ← D denote the sampling of the element x according to the distribution D, i.e., the element x is chosen as an output of an algorithm which has distribution D as its output distribution for elements of an underlying set.
As needed in later sections, let x ← D n v,σ denote the sampling of x according to an n-dimensional discrete Gaussian distribution centered at v with standard deviation σ, and let
n be the probability for this event. For brevity we write D 
The ring-LWE problem
Here we state the ring-LWE problem. The ring-LWE problem defined in [LPR10] is the adaption of the well-known LWE problem (for vectors or matrices, respectively) to polynomial rings.
Let q ≥ 2 be an integer modulus, let n > 1 be the degree of the polynomial f (x) defining R q , and let χ be an error distribution (the distribution χ will be the discrete Gaussian error distribution in most cases).
In the general LWE setting, a vector s ∈ Z n q (the secret) is given, and a vector a ∈ Z n q is chosen uniformly at random. Furthermore, two things are computed: an error term e according to the ("random") error distribution χ, i.e., e ← χ, and a pair (a, t) with t = a|s + e mod q.
In the search variant of the LWE problem, one has to find the vector s when given an arbitrary number of sample pairs (a i , t i ). In the decision variant, one is asked to distinguish between arbitrary numbers of LWE sample pairs (a i , t i ) and uniformly drawn samples (a i , t i ) from Z n q × Z q . The hardness of the (matrix) LWE problem is discussed in [Reg05] , [Pei09] . Two practical attacks, the so-called distinguishing and decoding attacks on LWE--based cryptosystems, are described in [LP11] .
The SIS problem over rings
The search variant of the Small Integer Solution problem p -SIS q,m,β,f with p -norm over rings and with parameters q, m, β, f is defined as follows: Given n = deg f (x) , and m polynomials g 1 , . . . , g m chosen uniformly and independently from T . Informally speaking, in the SIS problem one is asked to find a small integral and non-zero element of the kernel of the function g :
Mostly when just writing SIS, we mean the search variant of SIS.
In the decisional variant of the SIS problem, one is given either the set
. . , g m ), t , where all g i are uniformly chosen from R q , but t = m−1 i=0 g i e i for small integral elements e i , not all zero. The task is to distinguish both cases with non-negligible advantage, i.e., to state the correct case with probability significantly different from simply guessing.
In the work of [LM06] and [SSTX09] , the authors show reduction proofs in the infinity and Euclidean norm from the shortest vector problem (SVP) to SIS over rings. An algorithm that solves SIS can be used to solve SVP for polynomial approximation factors in ideal lattices in the worst case.
Signature schemes
In this section we present the two recent, very efficient and most promising signature schemes based on hard lattice problems, i.e., the treeless signature scheme of [Lyu12] and the trapdoor-signature scheme of [GPV08] using the new trapdoor of [MP12] .
Treeless signatures
The first provably secure signature scheme, whose security was based on ideal lattice problems, was introduced by L y u b a s h e v s k y and M i c c i a n c i o in [LM08] . Unfortunately, this scheme was only able to produce one-time signatures; combined with a (hash) tree structure, one could obtain a signature scheme which allowed to sign a limited number of messages. To address and solve this limitation, Lyubashevsky removed the tree structure and developed several versions of an unbounded signature scheme, called "treeless signature scheme" (TSS), in a series of works [Lyu08b] , [Lyu09] , [Lyu12] , which is provably secure in the Random Oracle Model.
The today's most efficient (ring) variant of the treeless signature scheme was proposed in [Lyu12] and is parametrized as follows:
• the lattice dimension n, being a power of 2, and the modulus q, which define the underlying ring
• a number γ of polynomials in the signing key and an integral bound d on their coefficients, • an integral bound κ on the size of the coefficients of the polynomials output by the Random Oracle H, • the (real) standard deviation σ of a discrete Gaussian distribution used in the signature algorithm, and • a (real) smoothing parameter M .
Define the set of signing keys S := {f ∈ R q : ||f || ∞ ≤ d} and the set {f ∈ R q : ||f || ∞ ≤ 1 and ||f || 1 ≤ κ} of outputs of the Random Oracle H for inputs from {0, 1} * , then the treeless signature scheme can be described as follows:
Output signing key (â,ŝ) and verification key (â, t) with
where
Concrete parameter choices for this scheme can be found in Table 1 , where the security level for the instantiations is for δ = 1.007 [Lyu12] . The parameter
2 used in the output-condition (1) of the signing algorithm is needed to decouple the distribution of the signature (ẑ, c) from the distribution of the secret keyŝ.
The security of the treeless signature scheme is based on the hardness of the ring equivalent of the 2 -SIS q,γ,β,f search problem with β = (4σ + 2d κ) √ m for d = (2α + 1)d + α and for some positive integer α, and on the hardness of the decisional variant of the ring-SIS q,γ,d,f problem.
The sizes for a signing key, a verification key, and a signature are (in bits):
Signing Key Verification Key Signature TSS 2γn · log 2 (q) (γ + 1)n · log 2 (q) (γ + 1)n · log 2 (q) 
A SELECTION OF RECENT LATTICE-BASED SIGNATURE AND ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
approx. signature size (bits) ≈ m log(12σ) 16500 20500
approx. signing key size (bits) ≈ m log(2d + 1) 2896 11585 approx. verification key size (bits) ≈ n log q 23170 32768
For practical parameters, i.e., n = 512, q ≈ n 4 and γ = 2, the signing key as well as the verification key have a size of about 18 kilobytes and the signature is of about 10 kilobytes in size.
The number of required operations for key generation, signature creation and verification are:
Gauss-samplings Polynomial mult. Polynomial add.
The parameter k denotes the number of sampling rounds during signature creation (due to the output probability which can result in rejections of produced signatures (ẑ, c)) and typically is k ≤ 7.
The advantages of the ring variant of the treeless signature scheme are small key and signature sizes which are (up to some factor) quasi-linear in the security parameter n: The signature key is of size 2γn · log 2 (q) , and the verification key and the signature are of size (γ+1)n· log 2 (q) , i.e., all sizes beingÕ(n). A second advantage are the small number of operations that have to be performed to create the keys, or compute or verify a signature.
On the other hand, during the signing process we have a conditional output of the produced signature which results in a probabilistic signature creation due to the unknown rejection rate. Furthermore, the scheme itself is proven to be secure in the Random Oracle Model, but not in the standard model. Thus, practical instantiations may lose the security properties provided by the authors. As a last point, there is no equivalence proof for the decisional and the search variant of the ring-SIS q,γ,d,f problem for d chosen according to [Lyu12] ("low-density SIS") since all equivalence relations are only shown for d being polynomial in the security parameter n. Thus, we cannot simply relate the security of the ring variant of the treeless signature scheme to a single problem like ring-SIS q,γ,d,f , as is done for the matrix version of the scheme.
Trapdoor signatures
The signature scheme due to G e n t r y, P e i k e r t and V a i k u n t a n a t h a n [GPV08] consists mainly of sampling a preimage from a hash function featured with a trapdoor. The security of this construction is based on the hardness of SIS. In [MP12] 
From this vector g T and the associated basis S k one can easily create S ∈ Z nk×nk q and the parity check matrix G ∈ Z n×nk q , respectively:
In what follows we describe the preimage sampling algorithm for a syndrome u from the q-ary lattice Λ ⊥ u (G) = {x | G · x ≡ u mod q} using the randomized nearest plane algorithm. Due to the niceness of the orthogonalized basis the algorithm reduces to a few steps where a 0 = u:
The authors of [MP12] provide two different types of instantiations for the trapdoor generation algorithm, namely the statistical and computational one, where each of them uses a different distribution to sample the trapdoor R.
In order to use the signature scheme of [GPV08] it is required to sample a preimage from a spherical discrete Gaussian for a given syndrome u ∈ Z n q using the trapdoor R. The Gaussian sampling algorithm mainly consists of two parts. The first part involves the trapdoor R which is used to transform a sample x from the primitive lattice Λ Sampling from a lattice Λ according to the discrete Gaussian distribution with parameter t means to use an appropriate sampling algorithm (e.g., rejection sampling) in order to get a sample x ∈ Λ from the distribution D Λ,t with probability ρ t (x)/ρ t (Λ) where ρ t (x) = e −π x /t 2 denotes the standard n-dimensional Gaussian function. Due to the fact that [ R I ] is not squared and the distribution of y with covariance COV = r 2 [ R I ] [R I] is skewed it leaks information about the trapdoor. An attacker could collect some samples and reconstruct the covariance matrix. Therefore we need the second part to correct this flaw. This can be done by adding some perturbations from a properly chosen distribution. Using the convolution technique from [Pei10] we can choose a parameter s that is slightly larger than the largest eigenvalue of the covariance matrix COV, and generate Gaussian pertubations p ∈ Z m having covariance Σ p = s 2 I − COV. The square root Σ p can be computed via cholesky decomposition. In order to obtain a vector b that is from a spherical Gaussian with parameter s it is required to sample a preimage y for an adjusted syndrome a = u−Ap from Λ ⊥ u (A). Then b = p+y provides a spherical distributed sample satisfying Ab ≡ u mod q.
The following signature scheme is the same as in [GPV08] except that the key generation algorithm of [MP12] is used. The main idea is to sample a preimage x for the hash value H(μ) of the message μ so that A · x ≡ H(μ), where H(·) denotes a random oracle. This scheme has the following efficiency measures. The size of private and public key as well as of a signature are (in bits):
Public Key
Private Key Signature 
Encryption schemes
In this section we present the two most promising lattice-based encryption schemes, namely the provably secure variant of the NTRU encryption scheme [SS11] as well as the ring-LWE based encryption system of [LP11] .
LWE encryption
There are multiple encryption schemes whose security is based on the LWE problem. The development started with the work of R e g e v [Reg05] , who presented a single-bit encryption scheme based on matrices. Followup schemes were presented in [Mic10] . The work of [LPR10] presents the first ring-based variant, it means, a more efficient encryption scheme with hardness based on the ring-LWE problem.
In this section, we detail the scheme of L i n d n e r and P e i k e r t [LP11] , which presents the most recent development in this line of research. The authors of [Mic10] , [LP11] show the matrix variant and explain how to generate a polynomial (ring-based) variant of the scheme. Here we only present the polynomial variant due to the advantages in key size and runtime of this variant. This scheme has already been presented in [GFS12] . It also includes a practical implementation of the LWE scheme. The authors present a software implementation of the matrix and the ring variant of the LWE scheme as well as a hardware implementation on FPGA of the ring-based scheme.
Let χ k and χ e be error distributions over R for key generation and encryption. The LWE-Polynomial encryption is a tuple (KeyGen, Enc, Dec), where
KeyGen(a):
Choose r 1 , r 2 ← χ k and let p = r 1 − a · r 2 . Output public key p and secret key r 2 .
Enc(a, p, m ∈ Σ n ): Choose e 1 , e 2 , e 3 ← χ e . Letm = encode(m) ∈ R q . The ciphertext is then (c 1 , c 2 ) ∈ R 2 q with c 1 = a·e 1 +e 2 and c 2 = p·e 1 +e 3 +m. Dec((c 1 , c 2 ), r 2 ): Output decode(c 1 r 2 + c 2 ).
The functions encode and decode compile messages from the message space to R q (encode) and vice versa (decode). Both functions are detailed in [LP11] and [GFS12] . Choices for useful parameters can be found in [LPR10] , [LP11] and [GFS12] .
The decoding during decryption will fail with a certain probability. If |e 1 ·r 1 + e 2 · r 2 + e 3 | is bigger than the threshold t = q/4 , decoding will fail. The failure probability is depending on the error distributions χ k and χ e , which is upper bounded by a value δ. It is common to chose χ k = χ e = χ [LP11] , [GFS12] . Different choices of the parameters n, q, c and s (s is the standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution χ) lead to different values of δ.
Following [GFS12] , s should be chosen such that
The encryption system we present here is provably secure as long as the decision ring-LWE problem is hard. I.e., an attacker breaking the LWE-Polynomial encryption system is able to solve the ring-LWE problem instance, and thus is able to solve certain lattice problems in all lattices of a certain smaller dimension (the so-called worst-case hardness). So far, most researchers believe that LWE in polynomial rings is as hard as over the integers. Therefore, the restriction of the security of the scheme to ring-LWE is not a concern.
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The size of private and public key as well as the size of a cipher are (in bits):
For key generation, computing a ciphertext, and decrypting it, the required operations are:
Key generation
Here we left out the computation of encode and decode.
NTRU encrpytion
NTRUEncrypt is a lattice-based encryption scheme proposed in 1996 by H o f f s t e i n, P i p h e r and S i l v e r m a n [HPS96] . NTRU is a promising encryption scheme because of its efficiency and because it remains essentially unbroken after more than a decade. However, there exists no proof that breaking NTRU is as hard as the underlying lattice problem. Recently, S t e h lé and S t e i n f e l d [SS11] proposed a variant of NTRU and proved that breaking this variant is as hard as worst-case lattice problems. In this section we present this latest version of NTRU, which we refer to as NTRU-CPA.
The encryption scheme NTRU-CPA=(KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is specified by publicly known parameters as follows:
• the dimension n > 8, which must be a power of 2, determines the cyclotomic polynomial f (x) = x n + 1 and the quotient ring R :
• a prime q > 5 such that q ≡ 1 mod 2n, determines the ciphertext space R q = R/qR, • a polynomial p ∈ R × q with small coefficients (typically p = 2, p = 3 or p = x + 2), determines the message space R p = R/pR, • a distribution χ determines the ring-LWE noise,
• and a positive real σ determines the discrete Gaussian distribution D Z n ,σ used for key generation.
NTRU-CPA key generation, encryption and decryption algorithms are defined as follows:
Set secret key sk := f and public key pk := h := pg/f ∈ R q . Enc(pk, m): Sample s, e ∈ R q from χ, and return ciphertext c := hs + pe + m ∈ R q . Dec(sk, c): Compute c := f · c ∈ R q and return c mod p.
Parameter choices
Concrete parameters for NTRU-CPA can be selected as follows.
• Fix p = 2 for simplicity and because it provides a useful message space.
• Set the distribution χ to be a discrete Gaussian distribution D Z n ,r , • and choose r = 8 so that the discrete Gaussian approximates a continuous Gaussian well.
• Fix a value for n.
• Choose a prime q between 2 21 r 2 n 5 ln(n) and 2 22 r 2 n 6 ln(n) for correctness.
• Set σ = 2n ln(8nq)q.
For this choice of parameters, the public key is statistically close to uniform, thus an attack implies solving the ring-LWE problem. For the choice of n, the running time of the distinguishing attack as described in [MR08] is given by log 2 (t adv ) = 14.4n log 2 q log 2 2 (c)
where c = q r ln(1/ )/π and is the advantage of the adversary. Table 2 shows parameters as described above and the corresponding run time of an attack.
The NTRU-CPA scheme has the following efficiency measures. The size of private and public key as well as the size of a cipher in bits are:
Public Key Private Key Ciphertext NTRU n log 2 q n log 2 q n log 2 q R. EL BANSARKHANI -D. CABARCAS -P.-CH. KUO -P. SCHMIDT -M. SCHNEIDER 
Further schemes

Zero knowledge
With strong security guarantees, lattice problems are also used to construct identification schemes, where zero-knowledge proofs are the main tool to construct secure identification protocols [FFS88] . The early study of zero-knowledge proofs based on lattice problems is due to G o l d r e i c h and G o l d w a s s e r [GG00] , in which they showed that coGapSVP and coGapCVP are in the class of statistical zero-knowledge proofs (SZK). In 2003, M i c c i a n c i o and V a d h a n constructed a SZK protocol with efficient prover [MV03] . Moreover, P e i k e r t and V a i k u n t a n a t h a n proposed a non-interactive statistical zero-knowledge proof system with efficient prover based on the problems GapSIVP, GapCRP, and GapGSMP [PV08] . Later, L y u b a s h e v s k y [Lyu08a] , as well as K a w ac h i, T a n a k a, and X a g a w a [KTX08] , proposed concurrently-secure identification schemes based on lattice problems. B e n d l i n et al. [BD10] constructed a scheme based on worst-case GapSVP, in which proofs of plaintext knowledge can be obtained using the LWE scheme by R e g e v [Reg05] .
Here, we describe in more detail the scheme of K a w a c h i, T a n a k a , and X a g a w a [KTX08] , which is essentially a variant of S t e r n' s framework [Ste96] with the core string commitment technique replaced with one that is based on lattice problems. This scheme itself has several variants. For example, X a g a w a and T a n a k a rebuilt the scheme based on NTRU [XT09] ; the variant of C a y r e l et al., allows for a reduced soundness error [CLRS10] ; the variant of S i l v a et al., incurs a lower communication cost and hence is suitable for practical use [SCL11] . We explain the basic variant which shows the construction and allows for simpler explanation than the followup versions.
First, we define the lattice-based hash function and string commitment, which will be used in zero-knowledge proof systems.
Lattice-based Hash
This is a provably secure hash function [Ajt96] , [GGH96] for suitably chosen m and q. That is, a collision in the hash function would imply solving the worstcase GapSVP
2Õ
(n)
problem [MR07] .
Lattice-based String Commitment Com(s):
Let n, r, l ∈ Z and m = 2r.
Step 1: S ← pad(s), where the padding function pad could be according to the Merkle-Damgård construction.
Step 2: Cut S into (S 0 , . . . , S k ), where S i ∈ {0, 1} r−l .
Step 3: H 0 = 0 (or a fixed initialization vector).
Step 4: Here, we note Com : {0, 1} * → Z n q ; that is, the string commitment maps a string of arbitrary length to a vector over Z q .
With this, the identification scheme works as follows:
For the security parameter n, choose A ∈ Z n×m q , a random vector x ∈ {0, 1} m such that ||x|| 1 = m/2 (the hamming weight must be m/2) and y = f A (x). Output public key (A, y) and secret key x.
Action(A, y):
Step Prover 1 : Choose a random permutation π over [m] and a random vector r ∈ Z m q . Send commitments c 1 , c 2 and c 3 :
Step Verifier 1 : Send a random challenge Ch ∈ {1, 2, 3} to Prover.
Step Prover 2 :
• If Ch = 1, send s = π(x) and t = π(r), which reveal c 2 and c 3 , respectively.
• If Ch = 2, send φ = π and u = x + r, which reveal c 1 and c 3 , respectively.
• If Ch = 3, send φ = π and v = r, which reveal c 1 and c 2 , respectively.
Step Verifier 2 :
Otherwise, reject.
It is easy to check that the soundness error of this scheme is 2/3. Concerning the security of the scheme: Briefly speaking, breaking the identification scheme is to find a collision in the string commitment which implies a collision in the provably secure lattice hash function. Thus, the security of this scheme is based on the GapSVP problem, which is the decision version of the shortest vector problem. For details, we refer to the original paper [KTX08] . Finally, we summarize several state-of-the-art zero-knowledge identification schemes based on lattice problems in Table 3 . Table 3 . Comparison of zero-knowledge identification schemes based on lattice problems for n, m, q ∈ Z, the basis A, A 0 , 
Conclusion
In this paper we presented the most recent, thus efficient and most promising lattice-based schemes, which are the treeless signature scheme and the trapdoorsignature scheme on the one hand and a provably secure version of NTRU and an LWE-based encryption scheme on the other hand. We provided a detailed description of the schemes and have taken a glance on the sizes of keys, ciphertexts or signatures, respectively. We furthermore reflected the number of operations needed for all schemes and summarized them in the appendix. As a roundup, we shed light on zero-knowledge identification schemes based on lattice problems. Of course, there are several disadvantages of the provided schemes which have to be considered. For instance, the key generation step of the trapdoor signature scheme involves the cholesky decomposition algorithm, which is very time consuming. Furthermore the storage sizes of the required matrices are very large compared to the other schemes.
Key generation of the NTRU-CPA requires sampling a discrete Gaussian distribution with large standard deviation. If done using standard techniques, such as rejection sampling, this sampling takes a very long time.
The treeless and the trapdoor signature schemes are both proven secure only in the Random Oracle Model. The signature generation of the treeless scheme fails with a certain error probability, which increases the signature generation time. The soundness error in the identification scheme is very large. This causes large communication costs, since the number of rounds has to be increased. The matrix-multiplications are slow as well. The identification scheme will be more efficient when instantiated with polynomials over rings instead of matrices. The LWE scheme is already quite efficient, both for storage and computations.
We omit the zero-knowledge identification scheme, since it is a more complex protocol than the other primitives "encryption" and "signature". Table 4 . Overview of the gathered data-sizes of keys, ciphertexts, and signatures in bits.
Public Key
Private Key Ciphertext Signature TSS (γ + 1)n log 2 (q) 2γn log 2 (q) − (γ + 1)n log 2 (q)
· log 2 (q) n · log 2 (q) 2n log 2 (q) − q ≈ 5000 NTRU-CPA n log 2 q n log 2 q n log 2 q − Table 5 . Overview of the gathered data-operations required for computations.
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